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Abstract
We test for differences between the Great Recession and 
the Great Depression in the US, using unemployment 
rates. The test used is ANOVA. The hypothesis advanced 
is that the early phases of the recession and depression 
are non-different. At first we reject the hypothesis. But by 
incorporating government involvement for the two periods, 
we obtain moderate arguments for the acceptance of the 
hypothesis. The paper starts out with background ideas of 
the two periods, then proceeds to the testing based on actual 
data, deviation of actual from normal or NAIRU rates, and 
adjusted data for government capital injection and subsidies. 
Key words: Depression; Recession; ANOVA; Capital 
injection; Subsidies
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INTRODUCTION
Testifying before the House Committee on Financial 
Services, HP-1279, on November 18, 2008, Treasury 
Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. said “There is no 
playbook for responding to turmoil we have never 
faced.” In the same vein, writing in the op-ed column of 
the New York Times, Jan 4, 2009, the Nobel Laureate 
Paul Krugman wrote “This looks an awful lot like the 
beginning of a second Great Depression.”
In the Great Recession, “… long-term unemployment 
soared to levels not seen since the 1930s” and “the share 
of long-term unemployment (spells over 26 weeks) in 
total unemployment rose to over 45 percent, having 
never before topped 26 percent in postwar history” says 
Alan Blinder (2012, pp.136-137). From the statistical 
perspective, the analogy that the Nobel Laureate 
Christopher Sims’s made with fire in the kitchen puts our 
task at hand into perspective. He wrote:
On a typical day, the temperature rises while dinner is cooking 
and then falls. Suppose one day a fire started while dinner was 
being prepared and a fire extinguisher was used to put the fire 
out. The time path of temperature in the kitchen would look 
relatively normal, but it would be incorrect to say nothing 
unusual had happened, because had the fire extinguisher not 
been used, the temperature in the kitchen would have developed 
very differently that evening. (Sims, in Stock and Watson, 2012, 
pp.134-135)
Following Sims’s perspective, we may liken the use of 
the fire extinguisher to the early efforts of policy makers 
to extinguish the current financial crisis. The purpose of 
this paper is to compare the attempts of Presidents Hoover 
and Roosevelt administrations to extinguish the liquidity 
crises of the early phase of the Great Depression with 
that of Presidents Bush and Obama administrations to 
extinguish the problems of the Great Recession. 
The crisis of stagflation in the 1970s bequeathed to us 
three kinds of macroeconomic windows to look at the two 
periods. President Nixon was accommodating inflation 
when he increased the money supply to counteract OPEC 
supply shock in the early 1970’s. His successor, President 
Ford, adopted a neutral policy when the second round 
of OPEC occurred in the mid-1970s. President Carter 
followed President Nixon’s policy at the end of the 1970s, 
accommodating another round of OPEC shocks. It was 
the bold monetary policy of President Reagan in the early 
1980s that induced a recession to extinguish the double 
digit inflation rate, and his bipartisan fiscal policy package 
of cutting both business and personal income tax rates to 
induce the economy growth afterwards, which dominated 
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macroeconomic policies in subsequent crises. We shall 
have occasions to use the extinguishing, accommodating 
and neutral policy views to characterize the different 
policies between the recession and depression sample 
periods in this study. 
1 .  S Y N O P S I S  O F  T H E  G R E A T 
DEPRESSION POLICIES
The October 29, 1929 stock market crash had occurred 
seven months after President Hebert Clark Hoover took 
office (Hoover,1952, p.19). The president squarely sourced 
the cause of the depression to “finance—which has failed 
and produced by far the largest part of the demoralization 
of our systems of production and distribution” (ibid., 
p.25). He did not take to a “leave it alone liquidationists” 
approach as is customary for free marketers, but sided 
with those who would “use the powers of government 
to cushion the situation” (ibid., pp.30-31). This seems at 
best to be an accommodating rather than an extinguishing 
policy. He cushioned the landing by annual labor and 
public works expenditures for the period 1929 to1932 
with the expenditure of $356.5, $410.4, $574.87, and 
$655.88 million, respectively. In his four years term, his 
administration had “expended more than $2,380,000,000 
on public works” (ibid., p.450). The administration stopped 
the subsidies because it found that useful works of this 
type were about exhausted. Some economists have daubed 
President Hoover’s efforts the “Hoover New Deal”. “Hoover 
must be considered the founder of the New Deal in 
America. Hoover, from the very start of the depression, set 
his course unerringly toward the violation of all the laissez-
faire canons” (Rothbard, 1963, p.168).
On March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt kicked 
off his inaugural speech with primary interest for the 
domestic economy, and only a “good neighbor policy” for 
international affairs (Roosevelt,1969, Vol.1, pp.19-20). In 
his April 19, 1933 press conference, the President announced 
an embargo on the export of gold—coins, bullions, and 
certificates, which was put into effect the next day (ibid., 
p.61). By April 26, 1933, he announced two policy goals: 
stabilization of currency and stabilization of the market, but 
realized that those policies were “a pair of dice” (ibid., p.76). 
He also was struggling with resolutions in relation to tariffs 
and debts on the foreign front and railroad building on the 
domestic front (ibid., p.76). A program for public works 
was before Congress (ibid., p.144). The president later had 
to assure Congress that “the building of the St. Lawrence 
Seaway will not harm the railroads or throw their employees 
out of work; that it will not in any way interfere with the 
proper use of the Mississippi River or the Missouri River for 
navigation” (ibid., p.584).
President Roosevelt signed the Banking Act of 1933 on 
June 16, 1933. In that act, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) was only a temporary corporation, 
which was later to be made permanent by the Banking 
Act of 1936. The FDIC was a milestone in stopping runs 
on banks. Its major function was to “guarantee banks up 
to $2,500. When the law came up for extension in 1934, 
the House Banking and Currency Committee under the 
chairmanship of Steagall was leaning towards…$10,000. 
The Senate and House finally agreed on the compromise 
figure of $5,000” (Roosevelt, 1950, p.395). The coverage 
of the FDIC was seen as a major instrument for the 
stabilization of banks in the Great Recession, when the 
limit was expanded to $250,000 in January 2013.
As of mid-1933 nothing firm was done on tariffs and 
debts (ibid., p.194). Regarding foreign debt, the president’s 
position was that each nation owing the US should submit 
individual proposals about their repayment plans (ibid., 
p.208). By October 1933, the president was determined 
“… to enable agriculture and industry once more to give 
work to the unemployed.” The procedure was to inflate 
gold prices by fixing the dollar to gold, and allowing the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to buy gold at 
a higher price (ibid, pp.435- 436). Progress on the stability 
of currency was slow. On the domestic front, the National 
Industrial Recovery Act was passed in June 1933, which 
had broadly defined for industry “what the hours of work 
should be” (ibid., p.276). On the foreign front, by the end 
of 1933 the President characterized the problem as follows: 
“…we wonder when we wake up in the morning where the 
Pound and the Franc & other currencies are going to go in 
the course of the day” (ibid., p.518) .
Roosevelt (1950, p.382) called the year 1934 the year 
of “The Advance of Recovery and Reform.” Inflating the 
dollar was a top priority. “The RFC and Treasure would 
have quite a large sum in gold on the other side—London 
and Paris” (Roosevelt, 1969, Vol.1, p.627). Instead of 
using helicopters to drop the gold at homes in the style of 
Milton Friedman dropping dollars bills on the streets, it 
was proposed to bring the gold by naval vessel. What was 
significant is that the monetary transmission mechanism 
would come into play to stop deflation, which was a result 
of falling farm prices. The view of the administration is 
captured by the following quote:
Dean Acheson of the Treasury, and Henry Morgenthau, Jr., 
then of the Farm Credit Administration, set the price at which 
gold was purchased. The first price set was $31.36 an ounce 
equivalent to a 66-cent dollar. By January 31, 1934, the 
government was buying gold at $35 an ounce, which meant the 
dollar had been devalued to 59.06 cents, the figure at which it 
was pegged. (Roosevelt, 1950, p.366) 
In 1934 The Gold Reserve Act was enacted “…as a 
step in improving our financial and monetary system” 
(Roosevelt, Vol.2, p.116-117). The inflow of gold would 
increase the money supply, lower the interest rate and 
stimulate investment, creating a multiplier effect on GDP. 
(Romer, 1992, p.782). Regarding debt, an assessment was 
made for the first time in 1934 that over the preceding 38 
year, the world owed the U.S. approximately $22 Billion, 
but repayment was a big issue (Roosevelt,1969, Vol.2, 
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p.153). By October 1934, the set of goals the president 
contemplated seem to lack the instruments to achieve 
them, and were characterized as “Fat Hopes,” based 
on US demands, British demands, and Japanese parity, 
according to a cartoon portrayal (ibid., Vol.2, p.237).
2 .  S Y N O P S I S  O F  T H E  G R E A T 
RECESSION POLICIES
The Great Recession started in the fall of 2007. A National 
Commission Inquiry Report (NCIR) casts its findings in 
some stylized facts—the crisis was avoidable; corporate 
governance and risk management failed; financial 
institution engaged in excessive borrowing and risky 
investment; the government was ill prepared to handle the 
situation; there was a breakdown of accountability and 
ethics; contagion was upon mortgage lending and security 
activities; over-the-counter derivative collapse, and credit 
rating was mismanaged (NCIR, 2011, pp.xvii-xxviii).
At the inception, the FED discount window could not 
provide the liquidity the financial institutions needed. (ibid., 
p.274). A year later on October 3, 2008, President George 
W. Bush signed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
into law. It appears to be a repeat of the RFC introduced 
in 1932 by the Hoover administration only that TARP 
happened within a year of the initial crisis. The RFC bailed 
out distressed banks, and bought stocks in approximately 
6,000 banks to the extent of $1.3 billion estimated to 
be worth about $200B in today’s value, much smaller 
compared with TARP. (See New York Times, October 
14, 2008, Intervention Is Bold, but Has a Basis in History 
by Steve Lohr) TARP was authorized for the spending of 
$700 Billion. In the next quarter, on February 17, 2009, 
President Obama signed The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) authorized to spend 
$787 Billion. Both TARP and ARRA funds were disbursed 
in installments and had some multiplier effect on GDP and 
employment (CEA Report, 2009). 
The national debt at the end of President Bush term 
(2008) was $10,024 billion, compared with $16,066 
billion by the end of President Obama first term 
(2013). As a percentage of GDP they are 68.1 and 98.9 
percent, respectively. They are approximately twice 
the percentages of debt to nominal GDP carried by the 
Hoover and Roosevelt administration. This comparison 
underscores the point of our investigation that the Great 
Recession was treated with more lavish government 
expenditures than the Great Depression. Table 1 below 
places the figures side-by-side.
Table 1
Government Debt for the Sample Periods
Presidents Terms Dates Nominal GDP $B Debt $B
Percentage 
of GDP
Hoover 1929-1932 1932 59.5 22.5 37.82
Roosevelt 1933-1936 1936 84.9 38.3 45.11
Bush 2001-2008 9/08 14,720.3 10,024 68.10
Obama 2009 9/12 16,244.6 16,066 98.90
Sources: Debt: http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/
histdebt_histo5.htm
GDP: http://bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp
This paper leans on the premise that TARP and 
ARRA blocked the current recession from turning into 
a depression as is represented by Blinder and Krugman 
ideas above. We examine the hypothesis that without 
such blockings, the early stages of the depression and 
the recession as manifested by the unusually high 
unemployment rates would take the form of a non-
different null hypothesis.
Economic analysis for the early phases of the Great 
Depression is scanty. A dominant theme in the literature 
is the recovery period which is dated from 1934 to World 
War II. Such analysis of the business cycle is notoriously 
divided into two schools of thought. Basically, we find 
Keynesians focusing on the fiscal side and the monetarists 
on the financial side of the recovery. Some empirical 
studies which include that of Brown (1956), Romer (1992), 
De Long and Summers (1988), and Vernon (1994) represent 
the Keynesian side. Essentially, this article is different in 
that it addresses only the early phases of the Depression and 
Recession. It brings in statistical considerations to appraise 
the differences between the early phases of the Great 
Depression and the current Great Recession.
To spotl ight  the government’s impact on the 
depression, we highlight Samuelson’s dictum that “…
it is a myth which will not die that deficit financing was 
tried in the 1930s and was found to failed, that it took the 
Second World War to bring back prosperity.” (Samuelson, 
1986, p.276) For our sample period, E. C. Brown 
documented that government fiscal impact at federal state 
and local levels were higher in 1930s for the years 1931 
and 1936. (Brown, 1956, p.863) As if to complement 
this argument, Christina Romer argued that the influx of 
gold created a monetary impact that also had a multiplier 
impact on the economy. (Romer, 1992)
3.  STATISTICAL MODEL
We test a statistical model that explains and predicts 
variations of unemployment rates for the two crises 
phenomena of the Great Depression and the Great 
Recession. The specification of the mode is as follows:
Model: yij=η+τj+eij
The first term on the right hand side is the grand mean, 
the second term is the treatment, and the last is the error term. 
The model assumes that the observations are independent 
and normally distributed with mean zero, and constant 
variance.
As with economists, statisticians too are divided into 
schools of thought. We are referring to the frequency, 
and the Bayesians schools of thought. The latter are 
looking for causes. We see it in many forms in the 
media. Does high debt to GDP ratio lower growth? Can 
cycles be caused by problems with the money supply 
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for the monetarists, the lack of consumption for the 
Keynesians, or the interaction between the multiplier and 
the accelerator according to the neoclassical synthesis? 
Our investigation is more about resemblance relationships 
than with a causal explanation, and is therefore, leaning 
more to the frequency theory approach of statistics. It 
contrasts with the Bayesians analysis where if it is given 
that we have drawn a red ball from K-urns, we would ask 
what is the probability that it came from a particular urn? 
Bayesian analysts look for causes. 
The financial Quants have sourced the Great Recession 
to many causes. A short list of these ideas would include 
the following:
●	Benoit B. Mandelbrot’s (1997) idea of “fat tails” 
that has been particularly used against the Variance 
at Risk concept of managing loss. It is now argued 
that a Generalized Extreme Value Distribution rather 
than a Normal Distribution should be used in financial 
forecasting. (Herzog & Turc, 2011, p.21) 
●	Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s (2005, 2007) two pronged 
ideas that we are being “Fooled by Randomness” and 
that there exist “Black Swans” that can put down a good 
syllogism. 
●	Emanual Derman (2011), a former Wall Street Quant 
leans on intuition over theories and models. For instance, 
in forecasting risk with decision trees we do not allow the 
branches of the tree to be closing towards the expected 
value. But intuitively we know that the principal on a 
discount bond will be paid back at maturity. 
●	George A. Akerlof and Robert J Shiller’s (2009) 
ideas to resuscitate Keynes’s Animal Spirit behavior in 
lieu of rational view in modern investment theory. 
All these ideas seek to explain the current Great 
Recession. As we indicated above, we wish to add to this 
search a resemblance view of the current recession with 
the early stages of the Great Depression. Our study takes 
the foundation of a simple statistical explanation of the 
difference between the incidents of unemployment rates 
during the two phenomenal occurrences. We have decided 
to look at the unemployment data that has now become 
available to start testing the unemployment rates during 
the early stages of the Great Recession and the Great 
Depression. While the test does not establish causality, 
it is designed to explain whether government capital 
injection and subsidies make a difference. 
4.  DATA
Unemployment rates for the Great Depression are readily 
available. Sample size is constrained by temporality of 
the early phases of the recession and the depression. We 
must make explicit the date of the sample period. The 
start of the recession and depression are taken as 2007 
and 1929 respectively. It is by chance that they happened 
in the fall of those years. It is also a coincident that 
both the beginning and end periods were bracketed by 
Republican and Democratic presidents-Presidents Hoover 
and Roosevelt for the Depression and Presidents Bush and 
Obama for the Recession. One major difference between 
the two periods, however, is that subsidies and stimuli were 
not present in the early depression period, but were almost 
hurriedly assembled for the recession. Policy makers have 
learned from the depression how to treat the recession. In 
fact, the media boasted about how the secretary of the FED 
was a scholar of the Great Depression.
As of the date of this analysis, the U S Bureau of Labor 
and Statistics has released unadjusted unemployment 
rates from 2007 to 2012. The matching data for the 
Depression would be for the years 1929 to 1934. The 
recession data we use is taken from Smiley (1983, p.488). 
This is essentially the data that Robert Lucas Jr. (1981, 
p.62) used to test his Rational Expectation hypothesis. 
Michael Darby (1976, p.5) adjusted the depression data 
in 1933 and 1934 downward to reflect persons on work 
relief programs that were not counted as employed by the 
Bureau of Census at that time. We will see that this is not 
an insignificant adjustment from our analysis in Table 4 
below. Table 2 below presents the unemployment data for 
the Depression and Recession periods under study.
Table 2 
Early Recession vs. Early Depression Unemployment 
Rates: Actual vs. Natural Rates
Great recession Great depression
Actual 
rates
Natural 
rates
Actual 
rates
Natural 
rates
2007 vs. 1929 4.6 5.00 3.2 4.5
2008 vs. 1930 5.8 5.07 8.7 4.5
2009 vs. 1931 9.3 5.23 15.9 4.5
2010 vs. 1932 9.6 5.43 23.6 4.6
2011 vs. 1933 8.9 5.50 24.9 4.6
2012 vs. 1934 8.7 5.50 21.7 4.6
Mean 7.82 5.29 16.33 4.55
Variances 4.35 0.05 77.17 00
Sources: Recession rates are from BLS and Depression Rates are 
from Smiley (1983, p.488). Natural Recession Rates are from CBO 
and Natural Depressions Rates are from Robert R. Gordon Robert R. 
Gordon, Macroeconomics, Pearson (1990, p.A2).
Figure 1
Changes in GDP: Depression vs. Recession
The period from 1929 to 1933 witnessed the most 
precipitous fall in GDP growth rate for the whole 
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depression period from 1927 to1942 (Romer,1994, 
p.760). Figure 1 below indicates that real GDP declined 
only during the first two years of the Recession (Series 2) 
and turned around in the third year while the Depression 
lingered four years in a row (Series 1). (Source: U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and 
Product Accounts). Figure 1 clearly shows larger decline 
in GDP growth rates in the depression phase of the cycle.
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The variance of the depression rates is about 19 times 
higher than that of the recession rate. This casts a 
doubt about the homogeneity of the variances. With 
6 observations, one may be able to tolerate a variance 
of 7 times as large as the other for a t-test (Iversen & 
Norpoth,1976, p.16). 
One usually employs a t-test for the analysis two 
means. The position taken here is that the t-test is a special 
case of an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), which enters 
the statistical toolkit for the testing of two or more means 
(Snedecor,1956, p.256). “When two treatment levels 
are used, the statistical test employed in the analysis is 
equivalent to a test by means of a t ratio for uncorrelated 
groups” (Kirk,1968, p.13). The “F test is easier to perform 
than the t” (Snedecor ,1956, p.257). For those reasons 
and in particular because we would be concerned with 
blocking out capital injection and subsidies from the data, 
we decided to proceed with ANOVA rather than the t-test.
In our analysis, treatment refers to the two independent 
samples of unemployment rates in Table 2 above. Table 
3 shows the results for the components of the model we 
described above. Each estimate of the model is cast in 
terms of sum of squares which corresponds to each of 
the model parameters. The sum of squares and degrees of 
freedom of the model can be listed as follows:
Table 3
Sum of Squares
yij η τj eij
Sum of Squares 2,374.95 1,749.67 217.60 407.68
Degrees of Freedom 12 1 1 10
The ANOVA results in Table 4 below gives an 
F-value greater than the F-Critical value. The model has 
two estimates of variances--The Within Group vs. The 
Between Groups estimates. The latter estimate (217.60) of 
the variance is conditioned on the null hypothesis that the 
treatment is zero. Because the F-value > F-Critical value, 
we reject that null hypothesis. Therefore, we reached 
the conclusion that the influence of TARP and other 
subsides have had a significant influence on variation of 
unemployment rates during the Great Recession so as 
to render a mean difference from the Great Depression 
unemployment rates. 
Table 4
ANOVA for Unemployment Rates in Table 2
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Recession 1 6 46.9 7.82 4.35
Depression 2 6 98 16.33 77.19
Source of Variation SS Df MS F P-value F critical
Between Groups 217.60 1 217.60 5.34 0.04 4.96
Within Groups 407.68 10 40.77
Total 625.28 11     
5.1  Natural Rate Adjustments
The prominent concern that there exists a natural rate of 
unemployment calls for adjustments to be made in the 
comparison. Economists have popularized this natural 
unemployment rate view as NAIRU—nonaccelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment. This estimate of the 
NAIRU rate had been uncertain. It involves the inflation 
rate and as Lucas Jr. puts it “…one would like to know 
what the average rate of unemployment would have 
prevailed since World War II in the United States had 
M1 grown at 4 percent per year during this period, other 
policies being as they were,” (Lucas,1994, p.288) This 
issue is reminiscent of Milton Friedman’s (1963, p.299) 
position that the Great Depression was due to monetary 
causes. For Friedman and Schwartz, the period 1929-
1933 was the period of “The Great Contraction” of the 
money supply. Paul Krugman (2007) has pointed out that 
the money base increased from $6.05 billion in 1929 to 
$7.02 billion in 1933, while the money supply fell from 
$26.6 billion to $19.9 billion, reflecting bank failures. 
Friedman’s position remains that the Fed failed to meet 
the needed liquidity of the banks. 
Another point about NAIRU is that it drifts upward 
with unemployment benefits. As Samuelson puts it: The 
“…natural rates of unemployment had become ethically 
unnatural because of the ever-weighted transfer-welfare 
programs of Scandinavian, Dutch, British, and North 
American Societies” (Samuelson 2011, p.312). In the 
more modern labor market view, unemployment benefits 
create a difference between wage-setting and price-
setting curves. Increased benefits make unemployment 
a lesser disutility, creates a situation of a higher real 
wage, which requires a higher unemployment rate to 
harmonize real wages and what firms are willing to pay. 
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This phenomenon was daubed a “discipline device” for 
unemployment (Blanchard, 2006, p.131) .
Table 5 
ANOVA Using Darby’s Work Relief Data for 1933 and 
1934
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
Recession 1 6 46.9 7.82 4.35
Depression 
2 6 88 14.67 57.08
Source  o f 
variation SS Df MS F P-value F critical
B e t w e e n 
froups 140.77 1 140.77 4.58 0.06 4.96
W i t h i n 
froups 307.14 10 30.71
Total 447.91 11     
John Maynard Keynes held the view that  “a 
progressive increase in unemployment will usually 
force the State to provide relief out of borrowed funds” 
(Keynes, 1936, p.251). This idea is very much present in 
the two sample periods we are discussing. For the Great 
Depression, Michael Darby (1976) made adjustments to 
the unemployment rate to reflect unemployment relief. 
He lowered the 1933 rate from 24.9 to 20.6, and the 1934 
rate from 21.7 to 16.0. To see if this makes a difference 
between the two periods, we re-run the ANOVA test for 
Darby’s correction for the two years. Table 5 below shows 
the results. It turned out that one can no longer reject the 
null hypothesis that government treatment is ineffective, 
namely, that in the model. The F-value, 4.58, is now less 
than the F-critical, 4.96.
5.2  Actual vs. Natural Rates of Unemployment
The above analysis takes into consideration only work 
relief programs. Further adjustment to the data can 
be made to take account of the NAIRU effect. This 
analysis will take the form of a deviation of the actual 
unemployment rate from the natural rate. The problem 
at hand is to come up with a reasonable estimate of the 
natural rate. The Nobel Laureate Robert Solow prefers to 
call it the “neutral” rate. (Solow and Taylor,1999, p.5)
In this section we test the deviation of unemployment 
rates from their normal rates. This means that we have to 
come up with natural rate estimates for the two samples. 
Robert R. Gordon (1990, p.A2) estimated that the natural 
rate of unemployment in the depression increased from 
4.5 in 1929 to 4.6 in 1934, a fairly constant rate. For 
the recession, the CBO estimated the natural rate of 
unemployment increased from 5.07 in 2008 to 5.5 in 2012. 
(U.S. Congress: Congressional Budget Office, 2013). 
As a preview of the difficulty of the matter at hand, 
we open the analysis in this section with a χ2 test. For this 
purpose, we use the normal level of employment as a natural 
candidate for the expected level. The null-hypothesis of 
the χ2 test is between the actual and the natural or expected 
data of Table 2. The test reveals χ2 values of 10.47 for the 
recession data, and 264.81 for the depression data. The 
critical value at the 95 percent level is 11.07. The conclusion 
is conflicting for the two periods: The recession data is 
pointing towards the acceptance of the null hypothesis that 
the differences are due to chance, while the depression data 
is pointing towards the rejection of the null hypothesis.
We next subject the data to an F-test, using the 
deviations of the actual from the natural rates. Using 
the deviated data, Table 6 indicates that the F-value 
of 6.43 exceed the F-Critical of 4.96 at the 95 percent 
level. When the Darby correction data was used for the 
two years 1933 and 1934, the F-value was 5.75 and the 
F-Critical was 4.96. In both cases, we failed to reject 
the null hypothesis of non-difference. We do observe, 
however, that in the initial years of both periods the 
economy was operating beyond full employment. 
Leaving out the years, namely 1929 and 2007 leads to 
even stronger results for rejecting the null hypothesis. 
Table 6
F-Tests for Deviation of Actual vs. Natural Rates of 
Unemployment
f-test f-values f-critical Null hypothesis
Full 6 year periods 6.43 4.96 Reject
Darby Corrections 5.75 4.96 Reject
Drop Initial Years 13.84 5.32 Reject
Darby Corrections 12.91 5.32 Reject
5.3  Blocking and Treatment Effects
The question arises as to whether one can block out the 
TARP, RFC and subsidies in the two series. This requires us 
to change the model by adding another term to the treatment 
parameter. Our model will now be yij=η+β+τj+eij. The new 
term β is estimated as the average of each year’s observation 
less the grand mean, namely, y- i - y
=. The estimated values of β 
for each year is then subtracted from each observation. Table 7 gives the results of this blocking test. 
Table 7
Results for Blocking Out Treatments Such as Government Subsidies on the Differences Between the Great 
Recession and the Great Depression
f-test Treatment statistics Block statistics Treatment effects Block effects
Actual data w/out
Darby’s corrections
9.08
(ρ = 0.15)
2.40
(ρ = 0.18)
No evidence against  the null 
hypothesis.
 Little or no evidence against the 
Null Hypothesis.
With darby’s corrections 8.88(ρ = 0.02)
2.87
(ρ = 0.15)
Moderate evidence against the null 
hypothesis.
Little or no evidence against the 
null hypothesis.
Actual vs. normal
w/out Darby
10.22
(ρ = 0.12)
2.18
(ρ = 0.20) Same as above Same as above
Actual vs. normal
with darby
10.34
(ρ = 0.01)
2.60
(ρ = 0.17) Same as above Same as above
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Table 8
ANOVA: Two-Factor Without Replication
Summary Count Sum Average Variance
Row 1 2 7.8 3.9 0.98
Row 2 2 14.5 7.25 4.205
Row 3 2 25.2 12.6 21.78
Row 4 2 33.2 16.6 98
Row 5 2 33.8 16.9 128
Row 6 2 30.4 15.2 84.5
Column 1 6 46.9 7.816667 4.349667
Column 2 6 98 16.33333 77.18667
ANOVA
Source of 
variation SS Df MS F
Rows 287.8175 5 57.5635 2.401197
Columns 217.6008 1 217.6008 9.076976
Error 119.8642 5 23.97283
Total 625.2825 11   
Each result of Table 7 is nothing more than a two way 
ANNOVA without replication test. The complete run for 
the first entry is given in Table 8 below. The other three 
runs are reported in condensed form only in Table 7.
The results of Table 7 indicate that attempts to block 
out work relief and government subsidies effects on the 
unemployment rates for the two periods do not reject 
the null hypothesis of equality of the variances overall. 
The results for the Darby corrected data, and NAIRU 
adjustment render some moderate support to reject the 
equality concept of the null hypothesis. The underlying 
theory is that had the government not been involved in the 
crises the different variations between the recession and 
depression rates would be similar seem to be tenable. 
CONCLUSION
In this study, the conclusion on whether to accept or reject 
the null hypothesis of non-difference between the early 
stages of the recession and depression has zigzagged quite 
a bit. When purely statistical matters are considered, a 
rejection is possible, but when economic meaning in terms 
of NAIRU and Subsidies are integrated into the test, an 
acceptance is possible. 
A straightforward ANOVA test between the actual 
unemployment data for the two samples leads to a 
rejection of the null hypothesis. The tug-of-war of the 
Between and the Within sum of squares would lead to 
a rejection of the null hypothesis that parameter in the 
ANOVA model is non-different for the two periods. 
We then followed the economic train of thought, 
making a correction for work relief subsidies for the 
years 1933 and 1934 in line with Michael Darby re-
estimate of the unemployment rates. The results lead to 
the acceptance of equality of the variances between two 
periods. We are led to the notion that the beginning of 
the two periods share similar characteristics even though 
the Bush and Obama administrations have had an early 
start in the injection of capital and subsidies to extinguish 
the downswing of the recession, and the Hoover and 
Roosevelt administrations have done so in a lagged 
manner for the depression. 
Ratcheting up the economics concept to bring in the 
NAIRU theory in macroeconomics, the results again 
began to swing. The NAIRU view has not led to the 
acceptance of the null hypothesis in the two instances 
we examined. One may say it rejects the null hypothesis, 
taking us back to the first, purely statistical results. One 
only needs to do a surface research, however, on the 
NAIRU hypothesis to find that it is controversial. First, 
it was supposed to replace Friedman’s 1978 Natural Rate 
Hypothesis with the Keynesian perspective developed 
by Tobin and Modigliani. (Szenberg & Ramrattan,2008, 
p.148) Second, there is much controversy on whether 
the latter period natural rate are higher or lower than the 
depression periods. Arguments abound in the area of the 
changing structure of the labor force due to the entry of 
women, younger people, and baby boomers that may 
underline the argument that the NAIRU is higher. Others 
have pointed out that while it was higher in the 60s and 
70s, it has become lower in recent years. 
A final statistical test resorted to blocking, that is an 
attempt to block out the influence of government actions 
in the nature of RFC vs. TARP, and subsidies program 
between the two periods. The analysis is statistical, relying 
on a two-factor ANOVA where column comparisons 
are made only after row differences are eliminated. The 
blocking results for the Darby and NAIRU data show 
some moderate evidence against the null hypothesis.
Adding up our results give moderate evidence that 
lead to the common notion that had the government not 
been involved in the current recession, the results could 
have been much worse. Because the evidence is only 
moderate, one cannot select the policy choice of one 
particular school over another. One has to be scientifically 
honest in further research by building structural models 
of the economy and subject them to the data. Meanwhile, 
we can state that the policy makers that took controversial 
stances, such as the Treasury Secretary Paulson, Jr. and 
the FED Chairman Bernanke were being pragmatic when 
it was in their hand to save capitalism. We would have 
liked to take the position with Keynes that probability 
does not matter, and join with others who are eager to 
render macroeconomics a non-ergodic discipline. But as 
we have seen, the blend of economic ideas with statistics 
can create an opening to look into economic matters, 
if only to find out that the statistical results moderately 
underscore pragmatic thinking that the government should 
be involved to resolve economic crises. 
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